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ABSTRACT
Dollarization, in a broad sense, is increasingly a defining characteristic of many emerging market
economies. How important is this trend quantitatively and how important is it for the conduct of
monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate regimes? Though these questions have become a
hot topic in both the theory and policy literature, most efforts are remarkably uninformed by
evidence, in no small part because meaningful data has been lacking, except for a very narrow range
of assets. This paper attempts to move the discussion forward and shed light on the critical questions
by proposing a measure of dollarization that is broad both conceptually and in terms of country
coverage. We use this measure to identify trends in the evolution of dollarization in the developing
world in the last two decades, and to ascertain the consequences that dollarization has had on the
effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policy. We find that, contrary to the general
presumption in the literature, a high degree of dollarization does not seem to be an obstacle to
monetary control or to disinflation. A level of dollarization does, however, appear to increase
exchange rate pass-through, reinforcing the claim that "fear of floating" is a greater problem for
highly dollarized economies. We also review the developing countries' record in combating their
addiction to dollars. Concretely, we try to explain why some countries have been able to avoid
certain forms of the addiction, and examine the evidence on successful de-dollarization.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  Dollarization, in a broad sense, is increasingly a defining characteristic of many 
emerging market economies.  Governments often borrow in dollars, individuals can hold 
dollar- denominated bank accounts, firms and households can borrow in dollars both 
domestically and from abroad.  How important is this trend quantitatively and what are its 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate regimes?   
For those countries that wish they weren't so dollarized; how easy is to scale back?  These 
questions have received a great deal of attention in both the theory and policy literature.  
Most of the answers thus far, however, have not been too convincing.  Competing definitions 
of dollarization and, most importantly, lack of empirical support for the various hypotheses 
advanced have conspired against the emergence of anything resembling a consensus. 
  This paper attempts to move the debate forward and shed light on the critical 
questions.  We propose a measure of dollarization that is broad both conceptually and in 
terms of country coverage.  We use this measure to identify trends in the evolution of 
dollarization in the developing world in the last two decades, and to ascertain the 
consequences that dollarization has had on the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate 
policy.  We find that, contrary to the general presumption in the literature, a high degree of 
dollarization does not seem to be an obstacle to monetary control or to disinflation.  
Dollarization does, however, appear to increase exchange rate pass-through, reinforcing the 
claim that "fear of floating" is a greater problem for highly dollarized economies.  
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  We then review the developing countries’ record in combating their addiction to 
dollars. We try to explain why some countries have been able to avoid certain forms of the 
addiction, and examine the evidence on successful de-dollarization.  We find that this record 
is not particularly encouraging; concretely, we are able to identify only two countries, out of 
a total of 85, that managed to achieve large and lasting declines in domestic dollarization 
without having to incur heavy costs in terns of financial disintermediation or capital flight.  
                                                    II. WHAT IS A DOLLARIZED ECONOMY?                                                                                      
  The definition of a dollarized economy has become quite elusive in recent years. For 
more than two decades up to the late 1990s the defining feature of a dollarized economy was 
the fact that domestic residents held foreign currency or financial assets denominated in 
foreign currency as part of their asset portfolio. After the Asia crises of the late 1990s, 
however, the term dollarization—and dollarized economy—started to be used by many to 
refer to the case of countries that did not issue a national currency, or that opted to replace 
their national currency for a foreign, more stable, one.
2 At about the same time a different 
strand of literature developed the concept of liability dollarization, stressing the role that 
foreign currency borrowing by the private and public sectors had on the vulnerability of 
emerging market economies to external shocks and, hence, on key aspects of macroeconomic 
management.
3                                                                                                           
  Terminology aside, it is relatively straightforward, both conceptually and empirically, 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Calvo (1999, 2000), Edwards (2001) and the collection of papers in 
Salvatore et al. (2003). 
3 See Calvo (1999), and Caballero and Krishnamurty (2000).   - 5 -   
 
to establish a meaningful distinction between economies that do not have a national currency 
and those where dollarization is only of a partial nature. Distinguishing between the two 
other “types” of dollarization, however, is a much harder task. One reason for this is that, 
broadly speaking, the two concepts of dollarization focus on different sides of the balance 
sheet. Related complications are that the data used in empirical studies to gauge the presence 
and/or macroeconomic effects of either concept of partial dollarization have serious 
measurement problems, and that studies typically neglect the possible co-existence of both 
phenomena.                                                                                                                          
  Figure 1 helps illustrate the severity of these problems. The figure depicts the foreign 
currency assets and liabilities of the private and public sector in a partially dollarized 
economy. The four boxes in the upper left corner of the figure, the foreign currency assets of 
households and firms, are the subject of analysis of the traditional literature on partial 
dollarization. The newer literature on liability dollarization, by contrast, is primarily 
concerned with entries on the right-side column; concretely, about the external foreign 
currency liabilities of households, firms, and the government.                                             
  Lack of reliable data on the various foreign currency assets and liabilities depicted in 
the figure have constrained the measures of dollarization used in the empirical studies related 
to both strands of literature. The traditional literature on partial dollarization, for example, 
has adopted as a norm the use of foreign currency deposits in domestic banks—typically as a 
ratio to some other monetary aggregate—as the “best” indicator of dollarization.
4 Severe data 
                                                 
4 In terms of the figure, this means that the standard measure of dollarization in the empirical 
literature typically relies only on the foreign currency assets of domestic residents that are 
indicated in the two boxes with striped borders.   - 6 -   
 
shortcomings have repeatedly thwarted attempts to construct a reliable measure of partial  
dollarization that includes estimates of the other three foreign currency assets held by  
A. Private Sector
B. Public Sector
I. Households I. Households
II. Firms II. Firms
III. Banks III. Banks
IV. Central Bank
V. Government
Figure 1. Foreign Currency Balance Sheet of a Partially Dollarized Economy
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households and firms in partially dollarized economies—including, importantly, cash 
holdings of foreign currency.
5                                                                                                
  The problems with which the nascent empirical literature on liability dollarization is 
confronted are at least as serious. Sectoral data on the foreign currency liabilities of different 
economic agents, and on the linkages across the balance sheets of those agents, are simply 
not available for the large majority of countries (see Allen et al. (2002)). The few empirical 
studies on liability dollarization that exist have therefore relied on indirect measures (such as 
the “pass-through” from the exchange rate to prices) rather than on quantity-based estimates 
of external foreign currency liabilities to gather support for their key hypotheses.
6     
         III.  AN ENCOMPASSING MEASURE OF PARTIAL DOLLARIZATION                                                      
  A key objective of this paper is to take advantage of, and shed light on, the 
interconnection between the two competing concepts of partial dollarization.  To this effect, 
we define a partially dollarized economy as one where households and firms hold a fraction 
of their portfolio (inclusive of money balances) in foreign currency assets and/or where the 
private and public sector have debts denominated in foreign currency.
7 This purposely broad 
definition covers the majority of economies in the world, as it excludes a priori only those 
                                                 
5 The reliance on measures of dollarization that exclude cash holdings of foreign currency  
has created a serious disconnect between the theoretical concept of currency substitution  that 
sparked the early empirical studies on dollarization and the findings of these studies. See 
Calvo and Végh (1992) and Savastano (1992) for early discussions of this problem.  
6 See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) and Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001). 
7 The foreign currency need not be the U.S. dollar. Any economy where private sector assets 
and/or private or public sector debts are denominated in a currency different from the 
country’s own would be a dollarized economy according to this definition.   - 8 -   
 
countries or territories that are fully—or officially—dollarized.
8 Because we are interested in 
studying partial dollarization in the developing world, we do not include industrial countries 
in our sample.
9                                                                                                                     
  To make the above definition operational we employ two devices:  (i) we construct a 
composite index of dollarization for every country in the sample; and  (ii) we classify the 
countries into four categories according to the variety—or “type”—of dollarization they 
exhibit.                                                                                                                     
  We define the composite index as the (normalized) sum of bank deposits in foreign 
currency as a share of broad money, total external debt as a share of GNP, and domestic 
government debt denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency as a share of total domestic 
government debt.  Each of the three components is previously transformed into an index that 
can take a value from 0 to 10.  Hence, in the end, the composite index allows us to measure 
the degree of partial dollarization of every country in the sample on a scale that goes from 0 
to 30 (see Appendix I).                                                                                                             
  We determine the variety of dollarization prevalent in each country at any point in 
time on the basis of two separate criteria: the degree of domestic dollarization and the 
amount of foreign borrowing by the private sector.  We gauge domestic dollarization by 
                                                 
8 The definition covers those countries that belong to a monetary union which have foreign 
(or domestic) debts denominated in a currency different from the currency of the union. Only 
those countries that were fully dollarized before 1980 were altogether excluded from the 
sample. See Edwards (2001) for a list of those countries. 
9 Concretely, our country sample excludes all those defined as “Advanced Economies” in the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook, except for Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan.   - 9 -   
 
looking at the ratios of foreign currency deposits to broad money and of domestic 
government debt in foreign currency to total government debt; countries are then divided in 
two groups: those where both ratios are below 10 percent, and those where at least one of the 
ratios exceeds 10 percent. To gauge the amount of private foreign borrowing we look at the 
share of private sector debt in total external debt; here too, countries are divided in two 
groups: those where private sector debt accounts for at least 10 percent of total external debt, 
and those where the share is below 10 percent.                                                                                                    
  The two criteria put together allow us to classify the dollarized economies into four 
categories or “types,” as shown in Table 1. Countries where domestic and external liability 
dollarization co-exist are classified as Type I; countries where dollarization is predominantly 
of a domestic nature (i.e., where foreign borrowing by the private sector is relatively small) 
are classified as Type II; countries where dollarization is predominantly of an external nature 
(i.e., where domestic dollarization is negligible) and private foreign borrowing is not small 
are classified as Type III; and countries where domestic dollarization is low and where the  







Table 1. Varieties of Dollarization
At least ten percent of broad 
money or of domestic public debt 
are denominated in or linked to a 
foreign currency.   
Type I Type II
Less than ten percent of broad 
money and of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or linked 
to a foreign currency.
Type III Type IV
Private sector debt accounts for 
ten percent or more of total 
external debt.
Private sector debt accounts for 
less than ten percent of total 
external debt.  - 10 -   
 
In our view, using the two-pronged approach just described to investigate the extent 
and effects of partial dollarization in the developing world has a number of advantages 
compared to the standard empirical study on partial dollarization.  
First, it produces a measure of dollarization for every country that encompasses both 
holdings of foreign currency assets by the private sector and the external foreign currency 
liabilities of the economy.  
Second, the inclusion of domestic government debt in foreign currency in the 
composite index takes explicitly into account a form of domestic dollarization that has 
become increasingly important in many countries and which has thus far been ignored by 
studies on dollarization (Figure 2).
10 
  And third, the approach relies on quantitative indicators easily applicable to all 
countries to measure the degree and type of dollarization, hence reducing the scope for 






                                                 
10  This variety of dollarization is of relatively recent vintage. Argentina in the 1980s and 
Mexico in the early 1990s were probably two of the first instances where governments of 
developing countries that had a national currency borrowed locally in dollar-indexed 
instruments to finance their fiscal deficits. Governments of many countries, in Latin America 
and elsewhere, have adopted a similar financing strategy since then. In fact, figure 2 shows 
that, as of end-2001, a total of 22 countries had more than US$ 230 billion of debt 












Of course, our methodology also has shortcomings. Three of these are worth 
discussing briefly.  
  First, owing mainly to lack of data, the composite index understates the “true” degree 
of dollarization in every economy.  On the asset side, it does not account either for the cash 
holdings of foreign currency or for the deposits households and firms maintain in banks 
abroad (see Figure 1). The downward bias that these omissions impart to the measure of 
dollarization may be significant for many countries.
11 On the liability side, the composite 
index does not include local borrowing in foreign currency by the private sector. The 
omission of bank loans in foreign currency is in part deliberate, out of concerns that their 
                                                 
11 For estimates of the amount of US dollars in circulation in emerging economies, and their 
implications for the measures of dollarization, see Kamin and Ericsson (1993), Feige (1996), 
Feige et al. (2003), and Oomes (2003). 
Source: see Appendix I. 
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inclusion would introduce double-counting.
12 The omission of other forms of local borrowing 
in foreign currency (e.g., locally issued corporate bonds denominated in foreign currency), 
however, is due exclusively to lack of data.  
  Second, the ratio of external debt to GNP and the share of private sector debt in total 
external debt are admittedly coarse measures of external liability dollarization that do not 
allow to gauge accurately the size and/or propagation of sectoral balance sheet effects.  
  And third, the composite index combines variables that are generally not determined 
or explained by the same set of economic and/or institutional factors. For example, a past 
history of macroeconomic instability and high inflation is likely to be one of the root causes 
of a high degree of domestic dollarization, but would probably not be a good predictor of the 
size of a country’s external debt. 
  Of the three shortcomings just mentioned, the last one is probably the least 
worrisome. The reason is that, because it measures dollarization along two different 
dimensions (degree and variety), our two-pronged methodology has the flexibility to test and 
cross-check any given hypothesis using all or part of the sample.  Illustrating the usefulness 
of the methodology for ascertaining whether the regularities and trends in the data depend on 
the degree and/or type of dollarization is, in fact, a key objective of the empirical analyses of 
the following two sections. 
 
                                                 
12 This is because, for prudential reasons, the share of foreign currency deposits in total bank 
deposits tends to be highly correlated with, and roughly the same size as, the share of foreign 
currency loans in total loans--see de Nicoló et al. (2003), Figure 2, for recent evidence.   - 13 -   
 
                                       IV. THE WORLDWIDE  SPREAD OF THE  ADDICTION                                                                           
  The application of the dual classification approach described above reveals a number 
of interesting trends in the evolution of dollarization in developing countries over the last two 
decades.                                                                                                                                
  One fact that stands out is the notable increase in the degree and incidence of 
dollarization that has occurred in the developing world between the early 1980s and the late 
1990s.  Indeed, Figure 3 shows that the frequency distribution of the composite dollarization 
index (computed using five-year averages for each country) has shifted markedly to the right 
between 1980-85 and 1996-2001. What this shift indicates is that the degree of dollarization  
in developing countries has risen during that period. The number of economies with a 
composite index higher than 12, for example, was much larger in 1996-2001 than during 
1980-85.  The rising dollarization of bank deposits in many countries and the increased 
reliance on dollar-linked domestic debt by governments account for the bulk of the recorded 
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Figure 3. Dollarization in the Developing World: The early 1980s and the late 1990s 
Source: See Appendix I. 
1/ Frequency distribution of all countries in the sample (including Type IV).    - 14 -   
 
  The higher incidence of dollarization—i.e., the increase in the number of partially 
dollarized economies—is captured by Table 2. According to the table, in the early 1980s less 
than 10 percent of the countries in our sample exceeded the low thresholds of domestic 
dollarization utilized to classify an economy as Type I or Type II; in the late 1990s, however, 
more than one-half of the sample exceeded one or both of those thresholds. The table also 
shows that two thirds of the countries were classified as Type IV economies in the early 
1980s, which implies that, not so long ago, external liability dollarization of government 
debts was the predominant variety of dollarization in the developing world. By the late 
1990s, however, the share of Type IV economies had fallen to almost one third. 
  The addition of new countries to the sample in the 1990s, especially the Transition 
Economies, and the increased availability of data on the variables used to construct the 
composite index, have indeed contributed to the changes in the aggregate indicators of 
dollarization reported in Table 2.  Nonetheless, it is still the case that by the late 1990s ninety 
developing countries (almost two thirds of the sample) exhibited varieties of dollarization 























At least ten percent of broad 
money or of domestic public debt 
are denominated in or linked to a 
foreign currency.   
6 (5.6%) 4 (3.7%) 10 (9.3%)
Less than ten percent of broad 
money and of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or linked 
to a foreign currency.
26 (24.0%) 72 (66.7%) 98 (90.7%)
Total 32 (29.6%) 76 (70.4%) 108
1988-1993
At least ten percent of broad 
money or of domestic public debt 
are denominated in or linked to a 
foreign currency.   
8 (5.9%) 35 (25.5%) 43 (31.4%)
Less than ten percent of broad 
money and of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or linked 
to a foreign currency.
15 (10.9%) 79 (57.7%) 94 (68.6%)
Total 23 (16.8%) 114 (83.2%) 137
1996-2001
At least ten percent of broad 
money or of domestic public debt 
are denominated in or linked to a 
foreign currency.   
29 (20.3%) 43 (30.0%) 72 (50.3%)
Less than ten percent of broad 
money and of domestic public 
debt are denominated in or linked 
to a foreign currency.
18 (12.6%) 53 (37.1%) 71 (49.7%)
Total 47 (32.9%) 96 (67.1%) 143
and shares in parentheses
Private sector debt accounts for 
ten percent or more of total 
external debt.
Private sector debt accounts for 
less than ten percent of total 
external debt.
Total
Private sector debt accounts for 
ten percent or more of total 
external debt.
Private sector debt accounts for 






and shares in parentheses
Private sector debt accounts for 
ten percent or more of total 
external debt.
Private sector debt accounts for 
less than ten percent of total 
external debt.
Number of cases
and shares in parentheses
Source: See Appendix I. 
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  Another important fact unveiled by our dual classification approach is the large 
regional variation that has characterized the spread, degree, and varieties of dollarization in 
developing countries during the last two decades. Table 3 illustrates this feature of the 
process of dollarization. The table shows that the average degree of dollarization in Africa 
has been similar to that prevalent in the Western Hemisphere throughout the years. However, 
the dollarization experienced by most African countries has been of the type IV variety. In 
terms of domestic dollarization—i.e., foreign currency bank deposits and domestic 
government debt in foreign currency—Africa has consistently been the least dollarized 
region of the world, followed by Asia.                                                                                
  Table 3 also shows that domestic dollarization has been consistently high in the 
Middle East since the early 1980s, and in the Transition Economies since the early 1990s. 
Moreover, in the latter group the average composite index more than doubled, and reached 
levels similar to the average for the Western Hemisphere, in less than a decade. Lastly, the 
table shows that dollarization has spread at a fairly steady pace across the three sub-regions 
of the Western Hemisphere since the 1980s, and that South America has consistently been 
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(scale: 0-30) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Africa 43 5 38 6 0 67 3
Emerging Asia 23 10 13 4 3 53 8
Middle East  13 6 7 5 11 38 4
Transition Economies 0 0 0 0 0 33 0
Western Hemisphere 29 15 14 6 5 60 10
  of which:
     Caribbean 12 1 11 4 1 75 1
     Central America 6 4 2 7 1 54 8
     South America 11 10 1 7 10 58 20








(scale: 0-30) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Africa 46 7 39 8 2 114 2
Emerging Asia 26 14 12 6 8 88 7
Middle East  14 10 4 8 20 66 11
Transition Economies 22 15 7 4 17 37 3
Western Hemisphere 29 12 17 8 13 106 4
  of which:
     Caribbean 12 2 10 6 4 198 1
     Central America 6 2 4 8 11 101 4
     South America 11 8 3 9 23 61 8








(scale: 0-30) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Africa 48 15 33 9 7 126 3
Emerging Asia 26 16 10 7 11 91 13
Middle East  14 12 2 8 21 60 19
Transition Economies 26 26 0 9 29 50 19
Western Hemisphere 29 21 8 10 23 62 11
  of which:
     Caribbean 12 5 7 6 11 101 1
     Central America 6 5 1 10 24 55 4
     South America 11 11 0 14 35 47 27
Total 143 90 53
Foreign currency 





Share of Private 
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Share of Private 
debt in total 
external debt
Source: See Appendix I. 
1/ Summary indicator for each region calculated as the unweighted average of all countries rounded to the nearest 
integer.   - 18 -   
 
  As we have said, distinguishing among four varieties of dollarization facilitates the 
identification of key empirical regularities in dollarized economies.  Hypotheses concerning 
the link between monetary policy and dollarization, for example, would seem a priori more 
applicable to countries that exhibit the first three varieties (types) of dollarization than to 
those classified as Type IV economies. The reason is that, conceptually, the relationship 
between government foreign borrowing—the primary form of dollarization in Type IV 
economies—and monetary policy is generally tenuous and weak, especially in cases where 
the public sector borrows mainly from official creditors. Empirical analyses of the links 
between monetary policy and dollarization, therefore, should probably exclude Type IV 
economies from the sample in order to obtain meaningful results.                                      
  Table 4 lists the ninety economies that comprise the sample of Type I to Type III 
economies for the period 1996-2001, ranked by the average value of the composite 
dollarization index. (The same economies grouped according to their variety of dollarization 
are listed in Appendix II.)
 13                                                                                                    
  The individual averages reported in the table reveal a fair amount of inter-regional 
and intra-regional variation in the degree of dollarization. For example, less than 50 percent 
of the countries with a composite index of 14 or higher (the group with “very high” 
dollarization) are from the Western Hemisphere,
14 whereas close to one third of the fifty 
                                                 
13 As noted earlier, the degree and variety of dollarization of each individual country was 
rarely the same in the early 1980s and in the late 1990s; the problems this presents for 
conducting empirical analyses are discussed in the following section. 
14 Ecuador recorded the highest degree of dollarization during this period (25 out of a 
maximum of 30) largely because it adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender in the year 2000 
and, hence, scored a 10 in two of the three components of the composite index in the last two 
(continued)   - 19 -   
 
countries with a composite index of 9 or higher (the groups where dollarization was “high” 



















                                                                                                                                                       
years used to calculate the average. Contrary to most other countries at the top of Table 4, 
Ecuador did not exhibit a high degree of dollarization in the early 1990s. 
Table 4. Degrees of Dollarization: Composite Scores, 1996-2001  1/ 
Composite Index 
Level









17 (2) Lao, Nicaragua
16 (2) Angola, Peru
15 (2) Cambodia, Paraguay
14 (5)




Bosnia & Herzegovina, Ghana, Honduras, Jordan, Tajikistan, 
Turkey
12 (8)
Congo DR, Croatia, Guinea, Indonesia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Yemen 
11 (4) Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Russia, Vietnam
10 (5) Bahrain, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Moldova, Philippines
9( 1 1 )
Armenia, Belarus, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda
Moderate 32
8( 9 )
Egypt, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Romania, St. Kitts and Nevis, Ukraine
7( 9 )
Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Slovak Republic
6( 6 )
Azerbaijan, Mauritius, Poland, Trinidad and Tobago, United 
Arab Emirates, Venezuela
5 (5) Albania, Colombia, Mexico, Solomon Islands, Uzbekistan
4 (3) Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Korea
Low 8
3( 1 ) K u w a i t
2 (5) China, Fiji, Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, South Africa
1( 1 ) T a i w a n
0( 1 ) O m a n
Source: See Appendices I and II.
1/ Individual country average for the period rounded to the nearest integer.
2/ Excluding Type IV countries.  - 20 -   
 
                V.  DOLLARIZATION AND MONETARY POLICY--MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?                      
  A view widely held among economists and policymakers is that partial dollarization 
makes monetary policy more complex and less effective. A recent IMF Occasional Paper 
summarized this view when it stated: “The phenomenon of dollarization poses a challenge to 
the pursuit of a coherent and independent monetary policy” (Baliño et al., 1999, page 14). 
Similar assertions can be easily found in numerous surveys and studies on partial 
dollarization.                                                                                                                          
  The conventional view is primarily anchored on theoretical results from the early 
literature on currency substitution, and on the fact that the first documented cases of partial 
dollarization in the developing world occurred in high inflation countries, especially from 
Latin America.
15  However, a closer look at the currency substitution models and at the 
empirical studies based on those models reveals a rather weak support for the view that 
dollarization hinders the effectiveness of monetary policy.                                                 
 The  early  theoretical models of currency substitution did produce important results 
concerning the effects that the presence of foreign currency could have on the exchange rate 
and monetary policy of an economy that issued its own national currency.  Many of those 
results have survived the passage of time and the adoption of new modeling techniques.
16  
Nonetheless, it has been clear at least since Thomas (1985) that currency substitution is not 
                                                 
15 Ortiz (1983) and Ramírez-Rojas (1985) were two of the first studies of the now vast 
empirical literature on dollarization inspired on currency substitution models.  
16  Examples of these are the results that established a strong direct association between the 
degree of currency substitution and the volatility of a floating exchange rate, the instability of 
domestic money velocity, and the inflation rate needed to close a fiscal gap with revenues 
from seigniorage. See Calvo and Végh (1992, 1996) and Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994).   - 21 -   
 
the same as asset dollarization, and that some of the results obtained from models of currency 
substitution hinged critically on the assumption that the demand for foreign currency 
represents primarily a demand for a second means of payment rather than for another 
financial asset.                                                                                                                                                       
 The  vast  empirical literature on dollarization in developing countries inspired by the 
early models of currency substitution has focused primarily on ascertaining whether the 
relative holdings of foreign money to domestic money (the “dollarization ratio”) in one or 
many countries can be explained by relative rates of return of the two monies, and several 
other variables. These studies generally have found that relative rates of return are indeed an 
important determinant of a number of variants of the dollarization ratio. Oftentimes, 
however, authors have used those results as a platform for making inferences about issues 
related to monetary policy that normally were implicit in the model used to derive the 
equations that were estimated in the studies, but that had not been tested directly--see 
Savastano (1996).                                                                                                              
 The  new  theoretical  literature on liability dollarization also has produced results 
relevant for monetary policy.  Of these, one that has attracted considerable attention is the 
association between liability dollarization and “fear of floating.”  That is, the conjecture that 
the presence of liability dollarization—i.e., of private sector debts in foreign currency—will 
tend to make countries less tolerant to large exchange rate changes, out of concern of the 
adverse effects those changes may have on sectoral balance sheets and, ultimately, on 
aggregate output.
17  This key result has clear implications for monetary policy, in particular 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000b, 2002) and Céspedes et al. (2000).    - 22 -   
 
for the relationship between interest rates and exchange rate shocks and for the scope for 
countercyclical monetary policy. Nonetheless, these models do not find nor claim that 
monetary policy is ineffective to control inflation, or particularly difficult to conduct in 
practice.                                                                                                                                
  As in the studies from the earlier strand, the main focus of the empirical work on 
liability dollarization has not been to test the effectiveness of monetary policy per se, but 
rather to detect and explain systematic differences in monetary policy responses across 
countries. Also as in the earlier literature, the results obtained by these newer (and fewer) 
studies are broadly supportive of their main hypotheses, as they tend to find systematic 
differences in responses of monetary policy across countries that are generally consistent 
with the hypothesis of fear of floating.
18 However, these studies have been less prone to 
make inferences about aspects of monetary policy that had not been tested directly. And 
typically have not interpreted their finding of systematic differences across countries in the 
responses of monetary policy as evidence of higher complexity or lower effectiveness of 
monetary policy, especially for inflation control.                                                            
  Surprisingly, growing evidence of the persistence of domestic dollarization in 
countries where inflation was successfully abated does not seem to have weakened the 
conventional view regarding the presumed ineffectiveness of monetary policy in dollarized 
economies.  Following the seminal study by Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) several authors 
have documented that large and sustained falls in inflation generally have not been not 
                                                 
18 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000b, 2002) and Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001).   - 23 -   
 
followed by a decline in domestic dollarization.
19  Moreover, a number of studies have 
explored the reasons for this empirical regularity--e.g., Uribe (1997), Ize and Levy-Yeyati 
(1998).  The starting point for much of this literature has been the premise that high 
dollarization can indeed co-exist with low inflation; that is, that dollarization does not 
preclude monetary policy from attaining, and maintaining, its primary goal.   It is not easy to 
reconcile this prima facie evidence of the effectiveness of monetary policy in partially 
dollarized economies with the notion that monetary policy is more challenging and/or less 
effective in the presence of dollarization. Nonetheless, that notion has tended to prevail.                                  
  It seems to us that further empirical work focused on the distinctive features of 
monetary policy in dollarized economies is needed to elicit a much needed revision of this 
entrenched conventional view. The dual classification approach developed in this paper is, 
we think, ideally suited for this task.  
Another look at the effectiveness of monetary policy                                                            
  In this sub-section and the next we present new evidence on the effectiveness and 
channels of monetary policy in partially dollarized economies. Our goal is to shed further 
light on the influences that dollarization exerts on monetary policy, taking advantage of our 
proposed broad definition of a dollarized economy and of our criteria for classifying those 
economies according to their degree and variety of dollarization.                                         
  The methodology we followed is fairly simple, and consists, for the most part, of 
using summary indicators for different groups and samples of dollarized economies to 
                                                 
19 Examples include Mueller (1994), Savastano (1996), Mongardini and Mueller (2000), and 
Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003).   - 24 -   
 
identify similarities and differences regarding key aspects of monetary policy.  A strength of 
the methodology is that it allows us to assess the evidence in support of any given hypothesis 
or conjecture using data from many different sub-samples.
20  An obvious shortcoming is that, 
with one exception, we do not use formal econometric tests to properly control for the direct 
and indirect influences that other variables typically exert on any given indicator of monetary 
policy.  Overall, we think that the gains we derive from the broad scope and multi-
dimensional nature of our analysis outweigh the loss stemming from its lack of accuracy. 
Especially since our main goal is to help place future discussions and research on 
dollarization in the right context, rather than provide firm and definitive evidence on the 
consequences of dollarization for monetary policy.                                                                                             
  The logical place to start any assessment of monetary policy is to examine the 
policy’s track record in delivering the main goals it is supposed to attain. There is little 
dispute that the overriding goal of monetary policy is to attain and maintain a low and stable 
rate of inflation, and that another important goal is to reduce the volatility of aggregate 
output--e.g., Fischer (1994).  Most theoretical and empirical models of monetary policy of 
the last two decades have summarized this wide consensus by expressing the objective 
function of the monetary authority in terms of two main goals: the rate of inflation and a 
measure of output fluctuations—both expressed relative to some target or trend--e.g., Barro 
                                                 
20 Specifically, the methodology allows us to use 10 to 14 observations to assess any given 
hypothesis or empirical regularity. These observations are the result of organizing the sample 
of dollarized economies in categories according to the level of the composite dollarization 
index (2 to 4 categories) and according to the variety or type of dollarization (3 categories), 
and from computing summary indicators for two different samples—the long (but smaller) 
sample with annual observations for the period 1980-2001, and the short (but larger) sample 
with annual observations for 1996-2001. See Appendix I. 
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and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985).  
  It is well known that the track record of developing countries as a whole in complying 
with those two main objectives of monetary policy is fairly unimpressive, especially until the 
mid-1990s. Overall, the evidence for the sample of dollarized economies used in this study 
corroborates this well known fact. The evidence, however,  also unveils a number of 
important patterns associated with particular degrees and/or varieties of dollarization.                                      
  With regard to the primary goal of monetary policy, the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 
shows that the average inflation rate is consistently higher and more variable in countries 
with a high degree of dollarization than in countries where the degree of dollarization is low 
or moderate, in both the long and the short samples. The evidence also shows that, excluding 
Brazil, average inflation is the lowest in countries where dollarization is predominantly of the 
external variety (Type III economies). A third regularity captured in these tables is that 
average inflation tends to be much lower and less volatile in the years 1996-2001 than in the 
sample covering the earlier period, reflecting the generalized fall in inflation in the 
developing world since the mid-1990s.                                                                         
  Clear patterns for output volatility and output growth are more difficult to detect. The 
one consistent regularity is that output growth is highly volatile in economies with external 
liability dollarization (Type III economies). The relation between output behavior and the 
degree of dollarization, however, is different in the two samples. In the long sample, average 
output growth is lower and less variable in countries with a high degree of dollarization. 
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 Table 6. Dollarization, Inflation and Output: Short Sample 1/
Very high High Moderate Low Type I Type II Type III
Inflation 
   average 91.5 35.5 14.6 3.1 14.3 54.1 7.4
     excluding Angola 31.7
   standard deviation 157.2 33.8 10.4 1.6 12.2 73.9 4.2
     excluding Angola 45.7
GDP growth
   average 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.0
   standard deviation 3.8 4.6 3.1 2.9 3.2 4.0 3.8
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s1 53 03 61 0 2 9 4 3 1 8
  1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III with an index of composite dollarization during the period 1996-2001





very high  moderate Type I Type II Type III 
Inflation 
   average  134.3  33.7 147.1 35.5 42.9 
     excluding Brazil  16.4 8.8 
   standard deviation  366.1  40.6 405.0 54.5 58.8 
     excluding Brazil  14.1 7.0 
GDP growth 
   average  2.7  3.7 3.1 3.1 3.9 
   standard deviation  4.2  4.7 4.7 5.3 5.3 
Number of countries 15  30 13 12 17 
  1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite 
dollarization index exists for most of the period 1980-2001—see Appendix I.
Table 5. Dollarization, Inflation and Output: Long Sample 1/ 
dollarization
By degree of By type of 
dollarization   - 27 -   
 
However, in the short sample output growth is markedly more volatile in economies where 
dollarization is high, while the average growth performance is broadly similar in countries 
with high and low degrees of dollarization.   
The ability to raise revenues from seigniorage is another benchmark commonly used 
in the literature to assess the effectiveness of monetary policy, or the value of monetary 
autonomy, in developing countries.
21  The theoretical foundations of this common practice 
are not nearly as solid as those that justify treating the inflation rate and output stability as the 
main goals of monetary policy.
 22 Consider, for example, the optimal inflation tax models. 
Those models implicitly assume that the central bank is little more than a tax collection 
agency for the government.  Such assumption may be reasonable in countries or situations of 
extreme fiscal dominance (e.g., during periods of very high inflation) but not in general, as it 
precludes making any meaningful distinction between monetary policy and fiscal policy.   
  It turns out that the revenues from seigniorage do not differ much across the various 
categories of dollarized economies, especially in the late 1990s. In fact, Table 7 shows that 
from 1996 to 2001 the average revenue from money creation across the various groups of 
dollarized economies ranged from 1½ to 2 percent of GDP and that the variability of those 
revenues across groups was also fairly similar. There are, however, a couple of differences 
among the groups that are worth noting. First, reflecting their different inflation performance, 
                                                 
21 For example, see Cukierman (1992), Fry, et al. (1996) and Berg and Borensztein (2000). 
22 Masson et al. (1997) argue that the prominent role that seigniorage continues to have on 
discussions of monetary policy in developing countries has hindered the emergence of widely 
agreed models and tools to assess the performance of monetary policy as an independent 
policy tool in those economies.   - 28 -   
 
revenues from seigniorage are systematically higher in countries with a high degree of 
dollarization than in countries with low or moderate dollarization. And second, average 
seigniorage revenues are higher in countries where dollarization is predominantly of the 
domestic variety (Type II economies) than in countries with the other two types of 
dollarization.  
      Table 7. Dollarization and Revenues from Seigniorage 1/
     (in percent of GDP)
      By degree of            By type of
      dollarization           dollarization
  high-to-   low-to-
very high moderate Type I Type II Type III
Long sample 2/
  Seigniorage (average) 2.60 1.40 1.98 2.98 1.06
      standard deviation 2.37 2.08 1.96 3.15 1.86
Short sample 3/
  Seigniorage (average) 2.13 1.41 1.40 2.09 1.73
      standard deviation 1.68 1.38 1.25 1.59 1.68
1/ Seigniorage calculated as the annual change in base money divided by nominal GDP, except in
    Argentina, Chile, Israel and Uruguay--see Appendix I.
2/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite dollarization
    index exists for most of the period 1980-2001--see Appendix I.
3/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III with an index of composite dollarization during the
    period 1996-2001--see Appendix II.  
 
  Successful disinflations provide another yardstick against which to assess the relation 
between dollarization and the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Our sample of dollarized 
economies includes 17 countries that were able to reduce inflation from a peak of 40 percent   - 29 -   
 
per year or more to single digits during the period 1980-2001.
23 Three salient features stand 
out from the examination of these episodes. 
  First, the degree of dollarization had no discernible effects on the duration of the 
disinflation. Specifically, the time it took these 17 countries to bring inflation down to single 
digits does not seem to have been influenced by whether dollarization was high or low at the 
time of the inflation peak (Figure 4, top chart). Except for Israel, which took almost 13 years 
to bring annual inflation below 10 percent, countries that had a high degree of dollarization 
when inflation was high did not take a much longer time to disinflate than countries with a 
lower degree of dollarization.  
  Second, the degree of dollarization at the time of the inflation peak does not appear to 
have influenced the growth performance during the disinflation. In fact, average output  
growth during the disinflation period in those countries where dollarization was relatively 
low at the time of the inflation peak is not vastly different from the average growth 
performance during the disinflation in countries that had a high degree of dollarization 
(Figure 4, bottom chart). 
  And third, successful disinflations generally have not been accompanied by large 
declines in the degree of dollarization. In fact, the top panel of Figure 5 shows that the degree 
of dollarization at the end of the disinflation was the same or higher than at the time of the 
inflation peak in more than half of the episodes. Moreover, the fall in the degree of 
dollarization in many of the other episodes was generally small. This persistence of the 
                                                 
23 The seventeen countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, 
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or on GDP growth during disinflation.
1/ Disinflation period defined as the number of years that it took for inflation to fall below 10 percent.  - 31 -   
 
dollarization process is consistent with the evidence on “hysteresis” found by the studies 
mentioned earlier—which were based on a narrower measure of domestic dollarization. 
  The persistence of dollarization is a regularity that is also present in the larger sample 
of dollarized economies, and tends to be associated with the countries’ inflation history. In 
fact, countries that had repeated bouts of high inflation over the last few decades generally 
exhibited a higher degree of dollarization in the late 1990s than countries with a better 
inflationary history (Figure 5, lower panel). Interpreting the (unconditional) probability of 
high inflation used in Figure 5 as a rough measure of monetary policy credibility gives some 
insights as to why achieving low inflation is generally not a sufficient condition for a rapid 
fall in the degree of dollarization; namely, a country with a poor inflationary history will 
need to maintain inflation at low levels for a long period before it can significantly reduce the 
probability of another inflation bout.
24 
  The lower panel of Figure 5 also sheds light on the relationship between current 
levels of dollarization and the countries’ exchange rate history.  Parallel market exchange 
rates and pervasive exchange controls have been the norm rather than the exception in 
countries with a history of high inflation. Conversely, very few countries with hard pegs and 
unified exchange rates have experienced bouts of high inflation.
25 The evidence thus suggests 
                                                 
24 The following section examines in detail the experience of countries that have recorded 
large declines in their degree of domestic dollarization, including in the context of 
disinflations. 
25 Recent estimates by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) show that more than 60 percent of all 
episodes where inflation exceeded 40 percent since the 1950s took place in countries that had 
dual and/or parallel exchange rates, and that less than 5 percent of countries with hard pegs 
and no parallel market for foreign exchange have had bouts of high inflation.   - 32 -   
 
a link between current levels of dollarization and countries’ past reliance on exchange 





















Figure 5. The Persistence of Dollarization 
1/ End of disinflation period is defined as the year when the inflation rate fell below 10 percent.








0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
















































0 5 10 15 20 25
















































Disinflation has had no clear effects on the degree of dollarization.
45°  - 33 -   
 
A look at the channels of monetary policy                                                                             
  Interest rates, monetary aggregates and the exchange rate are widely regarded as the 
three main channels through which monetary policy affects the economy. Even for industrial 
countries, however, there is considerably less consensus about the relative importance and 
role of those three channels in the monetary transmission process than there is about the main 
goals of monetary policy (Mishkin (1995)).  For developing countries, where research on the 
monetary transmission process is much thinner, consensus is far more elusive. In fact, the 
wide disparities in financial deepening, fiscal dominance and integration to capital markets, 
and the uneven pace at which reform in those areas has proceeded in different countries and  
regions have held back progress in identifying the distinctive features of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in developing economies.
26                                                                                          
  There is particularly little analysis on the interest rate channel. Heavy reliance on 
interest rate controls, capital controls and monetary financing of fiscal deficits until the late  
1980s (and, in some cases, until much later) rendered the interest rate channel of monetary 
transmission largely inoperative for many countries. Empirical research on this channel, 
including the one sparked by the recent literature on liability dollarization, has therefore been 
largely limited to the experience of the most advanced developing economies in the 1990s.                             
  The problems surrounding empirical assessments of the other two channels are 
somewhat less severe. Money aggregates have gradually lost prominence in the monetary 
policy frameworks of many advanced developing economies that have attained low inflation, 
but in most non-industrial countries remain a core channel of transmission and continue to be 
                                                 
26 See Fry et al. (1996), Masson et al. (1997) and Kamin et al. (1998).   - 34 -   
 
used in the formulation of monetary policy. Furthermore, it is not too difficult to obtain 
reliable data on these aggregates for the majority of countries. Empirical analyses of the 
exchange rate channel, on the other hand, are constrained by some of the factors that hinder 
assessments of the interest rate channel, such as the high inflation and capital controls 
prevalent in many developing economies until the late 1980s. Nonetheless, those obstacles 
have become much less serious in recent years, and problems of data availability are not 
nearly as limiting as those affecting interest rate series.
27                                                                         
  Reflecting this state of affairs, our analyses of the effects of dollarization on the 
monetary transmission process in dollarized economies focused primarily on the money 
aggregate channel. This allowed us to empirically assess whether the changes in this channel 
that were central to many theoretical predictions of the early literature on dollarization—
namely, that dollarization affects the level and variability of money velocity, as well as the 
link between money and national income—were borne out by the data. In addition, we used 
data for the late 1990s to obtain estimates of the exchange rate “pass-through” and to 
examine the links between dollarization and exchange rate regimes, two aspects of the 
exchange rate channel important for both strands of the literature on partial dollarization.                                
  Overall, the evidence on money velocity is fairly inconclusive.  For a start, 
dollarization does not seem to have had much influence on the volatility of base money 
velocity.  The standard deviation of the growth rate of base money velocity is broadly 
similar, and quite high, in groups comprising countries with different degrees of dollarization 
                                                 
27 The information content of official exchange rate series is a different matter, however; see 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).   - 35 -   
 
and different varieties of dollarization, in both the long and the short samples (Table 8).  The 
pattern is largely the same for velocity measures constructed with M1 (see Appendix III). 
The volatility of broad money velocity, however, does differ across groups. In particular, the 
velocity of broad money seems to be somewhat less volatile in economies with a low-to- 
moderate degree of dollarization, as well as in countries where dollarization is predominantly 
of the external variety (Type III economies). Taken together, these patterns suggest that 
dollarization tends to increase the instability of broad money velocity (and, hence, of broad 
money demand), but does not seem to increase the instability of velocity measures of narrow 
monetary aggregates—i.e., of the aggregates often used in the formulation of monetary 
policy in developing countries.  
 
High-to-   Low-to-
very high  moderate Type I Type II Type III
Panel A. Long Sample 2/ 
 Annual growth in velocity  
    base money  2.4  2.3 2.3 3.1 3.1
    broad money 3/  -1.0  -0.4 -1.0 0.2 -0.3
 Standard deviation 
    base money  19.4  20.2 23.9 21.5 19.9
    broad money 3/  15.3  13.2 16.8 15.3 10.3
Panel B. Short Sample 4/ 
 Annual growth in velocity  
    base money  -1.6  0.7 -0.8 -0.8 0.4
    broad money 3/  -3.1  -1.6 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4
 Standard deviation 
    base money  14.3  16.7 14.5 16.7 17.3
    broad money 3/  11.9  7.4 10.8 16.3 8.2
  1/ Estimates of money velocity for two other monetary aggregates are reported in Appendix III.
  2/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite dollarization
      index exists for most of the period 1980-2001—see Appendix I.
  3/ Including foreign currency deposits, except in Type III countries.
  4/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III with an index of composite dollarization 
      during the period 1996-2001—see Appendix II.
Table 8. Dollarization and Money Velocity 1/
By degree of By type of
dollarization dollarization  - 36 -   
 
  The growth rates of money velocity for different monetary aggregates also exhibit 
dissimilar patterns. The average velocity of broad money shows a steady decline in all 
dollarized economies, in both the long and the short samples. The decline is most pronounced 
in countries with a high degree of dollarization, and in those where both domestic and 
external liability dollarization co-exist (Type I economies). In contrast, the average velocity 
of base money shows an increase in the long sample, and a smaller decline than that of broad 
money in the short sample. Two inferences can be made from this dissimilar behavior of 
money velocity: first, the fall in the demand for domestic currency fueled by the high 
inflation of the 1980s seems to have largely abated by the late 1990s; and second, the joint 
existence of domestic and liability dollarization appears to have a positive effect on the 
financial deepening of dollarized economies.  
  Clear differences in the effects of dollarization on the monetary channel across 
dollarized economies are also difficult to detect on a wide range of money-growth 
correlations. 
  Monetary aggregates are strongly correlated with the rate of inflation in all dollarized 
economies (Tables 9-10). With a few exceptions—e.g., base money in economies with a low 
degree of dollarization, and a couple of other cases (see Appendix III)—the correlations 
between money and prices are uniformly high and statistically significant across all groups of 
dollarized economies, in the two samples. This evidence, while admittedly rough and 
tentative, is broadly consistent with the observed patterns on money velocity, and does not 
give much support to the view that reining in monetary growth is not an effective anti-
inflationary policy in dollarized economies. 
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                              Table 9.  Money Growth Correlations: Long sample 1/
      By degree of            By type of
      dollarization           dollarization
  high-to-   low-to-
very high moderate Type I Type II Type III
Pairwise correlations,  2/    Money growth with
  Inflation
     base money 0.61 0.23 0.44 0.41 0.26
     broad money 3/ 0.73 0.48 0.61 0.44 0.43
  GDP growth
     base money -0.21 -0.02 -0.33 -0.14 0.16
     broad money 3/ -0.13 0.00 -0.23 -0.13 0.33
  Consumption growth
     base money -0.31 -0.02 -0.25 -0.14 0.11
     broad money 3/ -0.28 0.03 -0.17 -0.10 0.17
1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite dollarization
    index exists for most of the period 1980-2001--see Appendix I.
2/ Contemporaneous correlations, average for the group. Number in bold indicates that correlations
    were statistically significant in more than one-half of the group. Correlations with other two
    monetary aggregates are reported in Appendix III.
3/ Including foreign currency deposits, except in Type III countries.  
 
                                  Table 10.  Money Growth Correlations: Short sample 1/
      By degree of            By type of
      dollarization           dollarization
very high    high moderate    low Type I Type II Type III
Pairwise correlations,  2/        Money growth with
  Inflation
     base money 0.93 0.68 0.61 0.21 0.59 0.88 0.44
     broad money 3/ 0.94 0.79 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.88 0.70
  GDP growth
     base money 0.10 -0.07 0.09 0.27 -0.04 0.02 0.30
     broad money 3/ 0.14 -0.16 0.13 0.65 0.02 -0.03 0.28
  Consumption growth
     base money -0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.27 0.01 -0.09 0.17
     broad money 3/ -0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.32 -0.01 -0.06 0.13
1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III with an index of composite dollarization for the period
    1996-2001--see Appendix I.
2/ Panel correlations, contemporaneous. Statistically significant coefficients in bold. Correlations with other two
    monetary aggregates are reported in Appendix III.
3/  Including foreign currency deposits, except in Type III countries.    - 38 -   
 
The correlation between monetary aggregates and real variables in dollarized 
economies, on the other hand, is either weak or non-existent. There is some evidence of a 
positive and significant correlation between monetary aggregates and output growth in 
economies with a low degree of dollarization and in those where dollarization is 
predominantly external in the short sample (Table 10; Appendix III, Table 18). In all other 
cases, however, and particularly in the long sample, the correlations between money and 
aggregate output, and between money and real private consumption are not statistically 
significant, and are oftentimes negative. Based on these results, we would conjecture that 
factors different from dollarization are those that explain the low correlation between money 
and real variables, and hence the limited scope for countercyclical monetary policy, in 
developing countries. 
  We were able to find  more conclusive evidence of systematic differences among the 
various categories of dollarized when we analyzed the pass-through from exchange rate to 
prices. Table 11 shows the results from panel regressions covering the period 1996-2001. 
The results suggest that the inflationary impact of exchange rate changes was indeed 
different across dollarized economies.  Specifically, the pass-through from exchange rate to 
prices was the largest in economies where the degree of dollarization was very high and in 
those where there was little private liability dollarization (Type II economies), and was the 
lowest in economies where the degree of dollarization was low and in those where there was 
little domestic dollarization (Type III economies).   
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  The regression results also suggest that in the large majority of dollarized 
economies—i.e., in the 66 countries where the degree of dollarization was either high or 
moderate during 1996-2001—the pass-through coefficient is about 0.5, which is comparable 
to estimates found in other cross-country studies for developing countries.
28  These results 
are broadly supportive of one central premise of the hypothesis of “fear of floating,” namely, 
that a high pass-through coefficient is one of the reasons why central banks have little 




                                                 
28 Honohan and Shi (2002) obtain an average pass-through coefficient of about 0.3 using a 
similar specification and country sample, but longer time series, than those used in the 
regressions reported in Table 11. Kamin (1998) also estimates a similar equation using longer 
time series, and reports several regressions with a pass-through coefficient of 0.5 or higher. 
Lagged  Real exchange  Exchange Time  Constant Adjusted No. of
inflation     rate (level)  rate change   high moderate low openness 2/  trend  R2 obs.
dollarization  dollarization dollarization
Coefficient  0.20  -0.01  0.67 -0.20 -0.17 -0.50 -0.08  -0.01  0.02 0.89 424
t-statistic   (10.91)  (-2.15)  (16.24) (-5.99) (-4.71) (-4.28) (-2.57)  (-1.52)  (1.20)
Lagged  Real exchange  Exchange Time  Constant Adjusted No. of
inflation     rate (level)  rate change   Type II Type III openness 2/  trend  R2 obs.
dollarization  dollarization
Coefficient  0.19  -0.01  0.49 0.17 -0.18 -0.01  -0.01  0.03 0.89 424
t-statistic   (10.21)  (-2.70)  (10.17) (4.86) (-2.13) (-0.32)  (-2.21)  (2.02)
                      By degree of dollarization 
very high  high  moderate low Type I Type II  Type III 
0.67  0.47  0.50 0.22 0.49 0.66  0.31 
 1/ Pooled estimation for 89 countries. Annual data.
 2/ Openness defined as the average share of imports to GDP during 1996-2001.
              Table 11.  Dollarization and Exchange-rate Pass-through: 1996-2001 
By type of dollarization 
Interactive coefficients
Interactive coefficients
Panel A. Regression Results (dependent variable: inflation) 1/
Panel B.  Implied pass-through coefficients
A.2 By type of dollarization 
A.1 By degree of dollarization   - 40 -   
 
  The exchange rate regimes prevalent in our sample of dollarized economies during 
the period 1996-2001 also suggest a link between “fear of floating” and the degree of 
dollarization. As Table 12 shows, all groups of dollarized economies exhibited, de facto, 
remarkably similar degrees of exchange rate flexibility that corresponded broadly to regimes 
where the exchange rate fluctuated within relatively narrow bands.
29 In line with the results 
from the pass-through regressions, however, countries with a very high degree of 
dollarization exhibited a significantly lower degree of exchange rate flexibility—i.e., more 




                                                 
29 The exchange regimes associated with the scores of  7, 8 and 9 obtained in the exercise 
reported in Table 12 are, respectively, “de facto crawling pegs,” “de facto crawling bands 
narrower than or equal to 2 percent” and “pre-announced crawling bands wider than or equal 
to 5 percent;” see Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Table 4. 
Very high High Moderate Low Type I  Type II  Type III
Exchange rate flexibility 1/ 
    average score  6.8 9.0 8.4 8.9 7.7 8.8 8.7
    standard deviation  3.1 3.8 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.3
    number of countries  10  26 31 6 26  34  13
Test of equality of means      very high vs. rest of sample Type I  vs. rest of sample
     t-statistic 2/  -1.71 -1.23 
     (degrees of freedom)  14 52 
  Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and Appendices I and II.
  1/ Degree of exchange rate flexibility measured on a scale going from 1 (least flexible) to 15 (most flexible)—see Reinhart
and Rogoff (2002), Table 4. 
  2/ Critical t-values at 90% confidence level are 1.35 for the first test and 1.30 for the second test. 
Table 12.  Dollarization and Exchange Rate Flexibility: 1996-2001 
Degree of
dollarization dollarization
Type of  - 41 -   
 
VI.  COMBATING THE ADDICTION 
  The evidence reported in the previous section suggests that partial dollarization does 
not have first-order adverse effects on monetary policy, especially for the purpose of inflation 
control. This is not the same as saying that partial dollarization carries no costs.  Partial 
dollarization indeed can create large currency mismatches in developing countries. Those 
mismatches tend to remain hidden during tranquil times but can wreak havoc in all sectors of 
the economy, and particularly in the banking system, pretty quickly after a large depreciation 
(Goldstein and Turner 2003). The dynamics of bank runs, and the scope for arresting them, 
including through the provision of central bank liquidity, also are quite different, and more 
complex, in economies with a high degree of domestic dollarization--e.g., de Nicoló et al. 
(2003); Gulde et al. (2003). 
  The financial fragility of dollarized economies was brought to the fore in the late 
1990s by the Asian crises and, more recently, by the banking crises in Argentina and 
Uruguay. The evidence from these crises makes it clear that an attitude of “benign neglect” 
towards partial dollarization in general, and towards domestic dollarization in particular, 
carries considerable risks.  In fact, we would tend to agree that containing partial 
dollarization, and particularly domestic dollarization, is a worthy goal of economic policy in 
developing countries.   
  That being said, we are highly skeptical of recent proposals that outline the “road 
towards successful de-dollarization” without bothering to see what the evidence has to say 
about the origins of the addiction and about past attempts at combating it --e.g., Hausmann 
(2001), Levy-Yeyati (2003).  We do not think that any “de-dollarization blueprint” that 
ignores history can be taken seriously.  In our view, the merits of any such strategy ought to   - 42 -   
 
be assessed against, and contrasted with, the historical  track record of countries that have 
largely avoided domestic dollarization, and of those which have managed to reduce 
significantly their degree of domestic dollarization.  We provide a brief overview of those 
records in the rest of this section. 
Avoiding Domestic Dollarization 
  Almost one-half of the developing economies in our sample did not exhibit a 
significant degree of domestic dollarization by the late 1990s (Table 2, bottom panel). These 
are the 71 economies classified as Type III and Type IV; that is, the countries where foreign 
currency deposits accounted for less than 10 percent of broad money and where less than 10 
percent of the government’s domestic debt was denominated in foreign currency—or linked 
to the exchange rate (Appendix II). 
  Countries where bank deposits in foreign currency represented less than 10 percent of 
broad money exhibit wide differences among them, and can be usefully divided in three 
broad groups. 
  A first group is formed by countries that have not experienced periods of high 
inflation or severe macroeconomic instability and have managed to retain the bulk of private 
savings in their domestic financial system. India, many economies of South East Asia, and 
some from Northern Africa belong to this group. 
  A second group is formed by countries where large macroeconomic imbalances led to 
periods of high or very high inflation and where the authorities tried to avert the erosion of 
financial savings caused by inflation by promoting financial indexation schemes not linked to 
a foreign currency, and by imposing various types of capital controls. Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, and Israel, to some extent (see below), belong in this group.   - 43 -   
 
  And the third group is comprised by countries where the authorities relied mainly on 
financial repression and capital controls to try to arrest the erosion of financial savings fueled 
by recurrent bouts of macroeconomic instability. Waves of capital flight and secular financial 
disintermediation are central features of the countries in this group—e.g., Venezuela, 
Nigeria, and many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
30 
  As for avoiding the other form of domestic dollarization (locally issued public debt 
denominated in foreign currency), countries either have opted to refrain from issuing that 
type of instrument—the case of most Type III economies—or have been unable to do so due 
to the absence of a domestic bond market.  
  The above discussion illustrates clearly the endogenous character of domestic 
dollarization. Macroeconomic instability leads to financial adaptation. Countries with 
unstable macroeconomic environments facilitate such adaptation when they allow residents 
to hold financial assets indexed to a foreign currency or to some other stable unit of account, 
and stifle the adaptation when they impose additional distortions that lead to financial 
disintermediation and capital flight. These are the options governments have at their disposal 
to try to minimize the adverse effects of macroeconomic instability. They are all second-best, 
and they all entail costs. Theory and evidence suggest that the latter option is probably the 
most costly of the three. Ranking the other two, however, is more difficult.  
                                                 
30  Claessens (1997) and Ajayi and Khan (2000) provide recent estimates of capital flight 
from some of these countries.   - 44 -   
 
  In fact, domestic dollarization may not be the optimal form of indexation for most 
developing economies.
31  But it is also the case that in many of those economies financial 
markets are not large enough or deep enough to support a highly liquid market for indexed 
instruments.  Simplicity, credibility and transparency also tend to tilt the scale in favor of 
dollarization compared to alternative indexation schemes.  Overall, and notwithstanding its 
potential costs, it is an open question whether a rigorous comparison of the net gains of these 
two modalities of financial adaptation would show that avoiding domestic dollarization is the 
most suitable strategy (or the “natural” endogenous outcome) for all developing economies 
with a history of macroeconomic instability. 
Undoing Domestic Dollarization 
  We have shown in Section V that reducing inflation is generally not sufficient to undo 
domestic dollarization, at least in five year-plus horizons. Nevertheless, some countries have 
managed to reduce their degree of domestic dollarization. To identify those countries it is 
again useful to treat separately cases where the reduction in domestic dollarization originated 
in a decline in locally issued foreign currency public debt from those that originated in a 
decline in the share of foreign currency deposits in broad money. 
  The few governments in our sample that managed to de-dollarize their locally issued 
foreign currency obligations followed one of two strategies: they either amortized the 
outstanding debt stock at the original terms and discontinued the issuance of those securities, 
or they changed the currency denomination of the debt—sometimes, but not always, using 
                                                 
31 For analyses of the theory and practice of (non-dollar) indexation see Dornbusch and 
Simonsen (1983) and Lefort and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002).   - 45 -   
 
market-based approaches. Mexico’s decision to redeem in U.S. dollars all the dollar-linked 
Tesobonos outstanding at the time of the December 1994 crisis (using the loans it received 
from the IMF and the US) and to cease issuing domestic foreign-currency denominated 
bonds thereafter, is one example of the former strategy. Argentina’s decision in late 2001 to 
convert to domestic currency the government bonds that it had originally issued in U.S. 
dollars (under Argentine law) is a recent example of the second. 
  Falls in domestic dollarization caused by declines in the share of foreign currency 
deposits to broad money are more common in our sample. To identify only those cases where 
the reversal of deposit dollarization was large and lasting, we searched for all those episodes 
where the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money satisfied the following three 
conditions: (a) experienced a decline of at least 20 percentage points; (b) settled at a level 
below 20 percent immediately following the decline; and (c) remained below 20 percent until 
the end of the sample period . 
  Only four of the eighty-five countries with data on foreign currency deposits met the 
three criteria during the period 1980-2001: Israel, Mexico, Pakistan and Poland (Figure 6). In 
sixteen other countries the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money declined by 
more than 20 percentage points during some interval of the 1980-2001 period. However, in 
some of these countries—e.g., Bulgaria and Lebanon—the deposit dollarization ratio settled 
at a level considerably higher than 20 percent following the decline. And in the majority of   - 46 -   
 
the other cases (12 out of the 16) the dollarization ratio fell below the 20 percent mark 
initially, but rebounded later to levels in excess of 20 percent.













  In three of the four cases that complied with the three conditions for a large and 
lasting decline of the deposit dollarization ratio, the reversal started the moment the 
authorities imposed restrictions on the convertibility of dollar deposits. In Israel, in late 1985, 
the authorities introduced a one-year mandatory holding period for all deposits in foreign 
currency, making those deposits substantially less attractive than other indexed financial 
                                                 
32 This pattern was particularly common among the Transition Economies in the second half 
of the 1990s (e.g., Azerbaijan, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia), but was also present in other 
countries and periods—e.g., Bolivia and Peru in the early 1980s, and Egypt in the mid-1990s. 
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instruments—see Bufman and Leiderman (1992). In Mexico and Pakistan, by contrast, the 
authorities forcedly converted the dollar deposits into deposits in domestic currency, in 1982 
and 1998, respectively, using for the conversion an exchange rate that was substantially 
below (i.e., more appreciated) than the prevailing market rate. 
  Interestingly, not all the countries that introduced severe restrictions on the 
availability of dollar deposits managed to lower the deposit dollarization ratio on a sustained 
basis. Bolivia and Peru adopted measures similar to those of Mexico and Pakistan in the early 
1980s but, after some years of extreme macroeconomic instability that took them to the brink 
of hyperinflation, both countries eventually reallowed foreign currency deposits, and have 
since remained highly dollarized despite their remarkable success in reducing inflation—see 
Figure 7.  
Even in the countries where the restrictions on dollar deposits have, thus far, led to a 
lasting decline of deposit dollarization the costs from de-dollarization were far from trivial. 
In Mexico, capital flight nearly doubled (to about US$ 6.5 billion per year) and bank credit to 
the private sector fell by almost one-half in the two years that followed the forced conversion 
of dollar deposits, and the inflation and growth performance remained dismal for several 
years (see Dornbusch and Werner, 1994). In Pakistan, it is too recent to tell whether the 
compulsory de-dollarization of 1998 will be permanent or whether it will be eventually 


















  In the end, Israel and Poland appear as the only two cases on record of large and 
lasting reversals of deposit dollarization that had minimal side effects on financial 
intermediation and/or capital flight.  In both cases the de-dollarization started almost at the 
same time as the authorities embarked on a (eventually successful) disinflation program 
centered around a strong exchange rate anchor, and the domestic financial system offered 
assets with alternative forms of indexation (Israel) or very high real interest rates (Poland)--
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see Bufman and Leiderman (1995) and Chopra (1994).                                                           
  Whether the circumstances and conditions present in Israel and Poland can or should 
be replicated by other economies with a relatively high degree of domestic dollarization, is 
not all that clear, especially since it is not apparent that other types of indexation are always 
preferable to dollarization.  In our view, those interested in drawing blueprints for de-
dollarization need to tackle head on these difficult questions. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  In this paper we propose a broader and more up-to-date definition of partial 
dollarization that encompasses private sector holdings of foreign currency assets and private 
and public external foreign currency liabilities. With this new measure we identify recent 
trends in the evolution of dollarization in the developing world, take a fresh look at the 
conventional view regarding the supposed ineffectiveness of monetary policy in dollarized 
economies, and review the evidence on successful de-dollarization.  
  We show that there has been a large increase in the degree and incidence of 
dollarization in developing countries in the last two decades. By the late 1990s,  
72 developing economies exhibited non-negligible degrees of domestic dollarization, and 
another 18 had relatively high exposure to private external liability dollarization. We argue 
that a history of high inflation, increased reliance of governments on locally-issued dollar-
linked debt, increased access to global capital markets, and the appearance in scene of the 
Transition Economies are the key factors behind the recorded rise in worldwide dollarization. 
We also show that the spread of dollarization has not been uniform across or within regions; 
dollarization has been consistently high in the Middle East, in the Transition Economies   - 50 -   
 
since the 1990s and, especially, in South America, while it has been consistently low in 
Africa and in most of Asia. 
  Overall, we find little empirical support for the view that dollarization hinders the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. We show that average inflation has indeed been higher and 
more volatile in countries with a high degree of dollarization than in those where the degree 
of dollarization has been low or moderate.  
  However, we find no evidence that would suggest that dollarization makes it more 
difficult to bring down inflation from high levels, or that it alters or adds complexity to the 
monetary transmission process—particularly through systematic changes in the behavior of 
money velocity, or in the link between money and prices. Seigniorage revenues, a monetary 
policy aspect stressed by the early literature on dollarization, are found to be fairly similar—
both in terms of levels and variability—across all categories of dollarized economies, 
especially in the late 1990s.  Output fluctuations, and the scope for using countercyclical 
monetary policy to reduce them, are also found to be fairly similar in countries with different 
degrees and varieties of dollarization.  
  One area of monetary policy where we find systematic differences among the various 
categories of dollarized economies, at least in the recent period, is in the pass-through from 
exchange rate to prices. Concretely, our evidence suggests that during the late 1990s the 
inflationary impact of exchange rate changes was the largest in economies where the degree 
of dollarization was very high and in those where there was little private liability 
dollarization, and the lowest in countries where the overall degree of dollarization was low 
and domestic dollarization was negligible. We see these results as broadly supportive of 
recent theories of “fear of floating” that identify a high pass-through coefficient as one key   - 51 -   
 
reason why central banks in emerging economies exhibit little tolerance to large exchange 
rate changes. 
  We then review developing countries’ record in combating their addiction to dollars. 
Specifically, we provide a taxonomy of countries that have avoided domestic dollarization, 
and review the historical record of episodes of de-dollarization in the developing world over 
the last 25 years. We find that this record is not particularly encouraging. We are able to 
identify only two countries, out of a total of 85, that managed  to achieve large and lasting 
declines in domestic dollarization without having to incur heavy costs in terms of financial 
intermediation or capital flight--Israel and Poland.  If we include countries that paid those 
costs, we can probably add Mexico to the list.  We argue that these few experiences provide 
the background that is most relevant for a discussion of de-dollarization strategies, including 
in particular the circumstances and conditions that may contribute to the success of those 
strategies, and the horizon over which it may be reasonable to expect concrete results from 








  The sample of countries used in the study comprised, in principle, all non-industrial 
economies that issued a national currency during all or part of the period 1980-2001. Hong 
Kong, Israel, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were the only members of the group defined as 
“Advanced Economies” in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook that were included in the 
sample. Countries for which it was not possible to obtain data on either foreign currency 
deposits in local banks or external debt for at least three consecutive years during the period 
1980-2001 were excluded from the sample. 
 
Composite Dollarization Index 
 
  The composite index of dollarization for each country was defined as the sum of the 
ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money, the ratio of domestic government debt in 
foreign currency to total government debt, and the ratio of external debt to GNP. To 
construct the composite, each of the three variables were previously transformed into an 
index that took values ranging from 0 to 10. The criteria used to transform the ratios obtained 
from the raw data into indices are summarized in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13.  Indices of Dollarization
Recorded value Assigned 
of  ratio 1/ Index value
xi = 0 0
0   < xi  ≤ 0.1 1
0.1 < xi  ≤ 0.2 2
0.2 < xi  ≤ 0.3 3
0.3 < xi  ≤ 0.4 4
0.4 < xi  ≤ 0.5 5
0.5 < xi  ≤ 0.6 6
0.6 < xi  ≤ 0.7 7
0.7 < xi  ≤ 0.8 8
0.8 < xi  ≤ 0.9 9
xi  > 0.9 10
1/ xi ; i =1,2,3 represent the three ratios
used to construct the composite   
 
 
  The composite index for each country was calculated for all years between 1980 and 
2001 for which actual data existed for at least one of the three ratios. The average degree of 
dollarization for different sub-periods and/or regions reported in the tables and figures of 
Section IV is the average of the annual values of the composite index for each country in the 
corresponding group—in most cases the group average was rounded to the nearest integer.   - 53 -  APPENDIX I 
 
 
  The ranges for the composite index that were used to group the countries according to 
their degree of dollarization in Table 4 of the main text and in all the tables of Section V 
were the following:  
 
Table 14. Degrees of Dollarization 
 
Degree  Composite index value 









Varieties of Dollarization 
 
  The degree of domestic dollarization and of private sector access to foreign 
borrowing were the variables utilized to assign all countries in the sample to one of the four 
varieties (types) of dollarization summarized in Table 1 of the main text.  
 
  As noted in the text , domestic dollarization was gauged by looking at the ratios of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money and of domestic government debt in foreign 
currency to total domestic government debt. Countries where none of the two ratios exceeded 
10 percent during a particular period were regarded as having a negligible degree of domestic 
dollarization and were assigned to the bottom row of Table 1—i.e., were pre-classified as 
Type III or Type IV economies. Countries where at least one of the ratios exceeded 10 
percent were assigned to the top row of Table 1, and, hence, were pre-classified as Type I or 
Type II economies. 
 
  Private sector access to foreign borrowing was gauged by looking at the share of 
private sector debt in total external debt—a variable not utilized to construct the composite 
index. Countries where the share was below 10 percent were regarded as having limited 
access to international capital markets and were assigned to the right-side column of Table 
1—i.e., were pre-classified as Type II or Type IV economies. Countries where the share was 
10 percent or higher were assigned to the left-side column of Table 1, and, thus, were 
preclassified as Type I or Type III economies. 
 
  The variety of dollarization prevalent in each country was assessed at three different 
intervals of the 1980-2001 period: 1980-1985, 1988-1993, and 1996-2001 (see Tables 2 and 
3 of the main text). In each sub-period, the thresholds for gauging the degree of domestic 
dollarization and of private sector access to foreign borrowing were calculated by taking the 
average of the annual ratios for the corresponding years. Since the external debt series for the 
majority of countries ended in the year 2000, however, the private sector access to foreign 
borrowing for the sub-period 1996-2001 was assessed on the basis of the average from 1996 





  The length of the composite index series in each country was determined primarily:  
(i) by the length of the series on foreign currency deposits (in economies classified as Type I 
or Type II); and/or (ii) by the length of the series on external debt (in economies classified as 
Type III or Type IV). 
 
  There was a high variance in the length of the composite index series across the 
countries of the sample. One reason for this was the appearance in scene of the Transition 
economies in the early 1990s; another one was the sheer lack of long time series on the 
currency composition of bank deposits. To deal with this problem, all empirical analyses of 
the effects of dollarization on monetary policy in Section V, except the one on disinflation 
episodes (see below), was undertaken using two different-sized samples:  
(i) a long sample, comprising about 48 countries for which there were annual 
observations for the composite dollarization index and the other relevant variables for 
all (or most of) the period 1980-2001;
33 and 
(ii) a short sample, comprising the 90 countries for which there were annual data for 
all the variables for the period 1996-2001.  
 
  The countries that formed part of the two samples are listed below. 
 
Long sample: Angola, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hong Kong , Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
 
Short sample: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo DR, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tomé and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, Taiwan , Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad 
                                                 
33 The size and composition of the sample varied slightly depending on whether the analysis 
focused on the types of dollarization (41 countries) or the degree of dollarization (45 
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and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, 




  Table 15 below summarizes key features of the seventeen disinflation episodes 
discussed in Section V (Figures 4 and 5). Specifically, the table shows the years and the 
inflation rates corresponding to the beginning and end of each disinflation episode—defined 
as the year when the annual inflation rate reached its in-sample peak, and the first year when 
it fell below 10 percent. 
 
 
First year below 10%
year inflation year inflation
(annual rate, in percent) (annual rate, in percent)
Argentina 1989 3080 1994 4.2
Bolivia 1985 11750 1993 8.5
Brazil 1990 2948 1997 6.9
Bulgaria 1997 1058 1999 2.6
Costa Rica 1982 90 1993 9.8
Dominican Republic 1990 50 1992 4.3
Guatemala 1990 41 1995 8.4
Indonesia 1998 58 2000 3.7
Israel 1984 374 1997 9.0
Kenya 1993 46 1995 1.6
Mauritius 1980 42 1983 5.6
Mexico 1987 132 1993 9.8
Nigeria 1995 73 1997 8.2
Peru 1990 7482 1997 8.6
Philippines 1984 47 1986 -0.3
Uganda 1987 200 1993 6.1
Uruguay 1990 113 1999 5.7
In-sample peak





Data Sources  
 
Foreign Currency Deposits: data on foreign currency deposits were obtained from a number 
of sources. These included (number of countries in parenthesis): the IMF’s Money and 
Banking electronic database, MBTS, (44 countries), the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics, IFS, (13 countries); data provided by IMF country desks (26 countries), IMF staff 
documents (6 countries) and national sources—e.g., central bank websites or annual 
reports—(9 countries). 
 
Broad Money: the IMF’s MBTS and IFS were the primary sources for the series on broad 
money for about 70 countries. In those cases where the series on foreign currency deposits 
was obtained from a source different from the MBTS and IFS, care was taken to ensure that 
the broad money series used to compute the “dollarization ratio” (i.e., the ratio of foreign   - 56 -  APPENDIX I 
 
currency deposits to broad money) included foreign currency deposits. For the other 24 
countries, broad money series were provided by IMF country desks (12 countries) or 
obtained from IMF staff documents (6 countries) and from national sources (6 countries). 
 
External Debt: for most countries in the sample the series on external debt (total and private) 
were taken directly from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) database—
which, as of December 2002, only contained data up to the year 2000. For those countries in 
the sample not included in the GDF (e.g., Hong Kong , Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore) 
external debt series were obtained from the Joint OECD-BIS-IMF-World Bank Statistics on 
External Debt website and/or from IMF staff documents.  
 
Domestic public debt denominated in foreign currency information on this variable was 
solicited to, and provided by, IMF desks economist and corroborated with national sources. 
Altogether, we were able to collect data series on this variable for about 23 countries for the 
period 1996-2001 (see Figure 2). 
 
The series on Gross Domestic Product (nominal and real) and Real Private Consumption 
were obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. In all countries 
where the data on external debt originated in the World Bank’s GDF, the Gross National 
Product (in U.S. dollars) was used as the denominator of the external debt-to-output ratio. In 
the other cases the ratio was constructed using the WEO series of Gross Domestic Product in 
U.S. dollars. 
 
For most countries, the (annual) series on consumer price indices and reserve money (used to 
construct the series on inflation and seigniorage) were taken directly from the IFS. In the 
cases of Guinea, Lebanon, São Tomé and Principe, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates, and Uzbekistan the consumer price indices series were taken from the WEO. Data 
on exchange rates (end of period) were also obtained from the WEO and the IFS. 
 
Seigniorage was defined as the annual change in the monetary base divided by nominal GDP 
in all countries except Argentina, Chile, Israel and Uruguay. In these four countries, the IFS 
series of reserve money include indexed and/or remunerated deposits. To control for this, 
seigniorage was defined as the annual change in M1 divided by nominal GDP in the cases of 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay; and as the change in the monetary base excluding foreign 















1 Argentina 6 9 5 20
2 Azerbaijan 4 0 2 6
3B a h r a i n 4 0 6 1 0
4 Bolivia 8 7 7 22
5 Brazil 0 3 4 7
6 Hong Kong 5 0 2 7
7C r o a t i a 7 0 5 1 2
8 Czech Republic 2 0 5 7
9 Estonia 4 0 6 9
10 Hungary 2 0 7 9
11 Indonesia 3 1 9 12
1 2 I s r a e l 2068
13 Kazakhstan 3 1 3 7
14 Kyrgyz Republic 3 0 8 11
15 Latvia 4 0 4 8
16 Lebanon 6 3 5 14
17 Lithuania 4 0 4 8
18 Macedonia 4 0 5 8
19 Mozambique 4 0 10 14
20 Paraguay 5 6 4 15
21 Peru 6 4 6 16
22 Philippines 3 0 7 10
23 Poland 2 0 4 6
24 Romania 4 1 3 8
2 5 S a u d i  A r a b i a 2024
26 Slovak Republic 2 0 5 7
27 Tajikistan 3 0 10 13
28 Turkey 5 3 5 13
29 United Arab Emirates 3 0 3 6
Source: See Appendix I.
2/ Average for the period rounded to the nearest integer.
1/ Countries where at least 10 percent of broad money or of domestic public debt are 
denominated in a foreign currency and where the stock of private non guaranteed external debt 
is more than 10 percent of total debt.
Varieties and Degrees of Dollarization: Individual Country Averages, 
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1 Albania 2 0 3 5
2 Angola 6 0 10 16
3 A r m e n i a 4059
4 Belarus 6 2 1 9
5 Bosnia & Herzegovina 6 0 7 13
6 Bulgaria 4 5 9 19
7 Cambodia 7 0 8 15
8 Congo DR 2 0 10 12
9 C o s t a  R i c a 4239
10 Ecuador 7 9 9 25
1 1 E g y p t 3148
1 2 E l  S a l v a d o r 2339
1 3 G e o r g i a 4059
14 Ghana 3 0 10 13
15 Guatemala 0 4 3 7
16 Guinea 2 0 10 12
17 Guinea-Bissau 4 0 10 14
1 8 H a i t i 3037
19 Honduras 3 0 10 13
20 Jamaica 4 0 7 10
21 Jordan 3 0 10 13
22 Lao 7 0 10 17
23 Malawi 2 0 10 12
24 Moldova 2 0 7 10
25 Mongolia 3 0 8 11
26 Netherlands Antilles 2 0 0 2
27 Nicaragua 7 0 10 17
28 Pakistan 3 1 6 9
29 Russia 3 2 6 11
30 São Tomé & Príncipe 4 0 10 14
31 Sierra Leone 2 0 10 12
32 Slovenia 4 0 0 4
33 St. Kitts and Nevis 3 0 5 8
34 Tanzania 3 0 10 12
35 Trinidad and Tobago 2 0 4 6
3 6 T u r k m e n i s t a n 3069
3 7 U g a n d a 3069
3 8 U k r a i n e 3248
39 Uruguay 9 9 4 21
40 Uzbekistan 2 0 3 5
41 Vietnam 3 0 8 11
42 Yemen 3 0 9 12
43 Zambia 4 0 10 14
Source: See Appendix I.
2/ Average for the period rounded to the nearest integer.
1/ Countries where at least 10 percent of broad money or of domestic public debt are 
denominated in a foreign currency and where the stock of private non guaranteed external debt 
is less than 10 percent of total debt.  - 59 -  APPENDIX II 
 









1 Chile 1 1 5 7
2 China 0 0 2 2
3 Colombia 0 1 4 5
4 Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 10 10
5 F i j i 0022
6 K o r e a 0044
7 K u w a i t 0033
8 Malaysia 1 0 6 7
9 Mauritius 0 0 6 6
1 0 M e x i c o 1045
1 1 O m a n 0000
12 Papua New Guinea 1 0 7 8
13 Singapore 0 0 2 2
14 Solomon Islands 0 0 5 5
15 South Africa 0 0 2 2
1 6 T a i w a n 0011
17 Thailand 1 0 8 9
18 Venezuela 1 0 5 6
Source: See Appendix I.
2/ Average for the period rounded to the nearest integer.
1/ Countries where less than 10 percent of broad money and of domestic public debt are 
denominated in a foreign currency and where the stock of private non guaranteed external debt 
is more than 10 percent of total debt.  - 60 -  APPENDIX II 
 
Panel D. Type IV economies  1/
1 Algeria 28 Kenya
2 Bangladesh 29 Lesotho
3 Barbados 30 Madagascar
4B e l i z e 3 1M a l d i v e s
5 Benin 32 Mali
6 Bhutan 33 Mauritania
7 Botswana 34 Morocco
8 Burkina Faso 35 Myanmar
9 Burundi 36 Nepal
10 Cameroon 37 Niger
11 Cape Verde 38 Nigeria
12 Central African Rep. 39 Rwanda
13 Chad 40 Samoa
14 Comoros 41 Senegal
15 Congo 42 Seychelles
16 Djibouti 43 Sri Lanka
17 Dominica 44 St. Lucia
18 Dominican Republic 45 St. Vincent & Grenadines
19 Equatorial Guinea 46 Sudan
20 Eritrea 47 Swaziland
21 Ethiopia 48 Syrian Arab Republic
22 Gabon 49 Togo
23 Gambia 50 Tonga
24 Grenada 51 Tunisia
25 Guyana 52 Vanuatu
26 India 53 Zimbabwe
27 Iran
1/ Countries where less than 10 percent of broad money and of domestic public debt 
are denominated in a foreign currency and where the stock of private non guaranteed 
external debt is less than 10 percent of total debt.- 61 – 
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  High-to- Low-to-
very high moderate Type I Type II Type III 
Panel A. Long Sample 1/ 
 Annual growth in velocity 
      M1  2.4  1.6 1.9 3.1 2.0 
      M2 2/  1.3  1.8 1.6 1.4 -0.3 
 Standard deviation 
      M1  15.0  13.2 17.2 15.5 12.9 
      M2 2/  16.7  17.9 19.3 17.7 10.3 
Panel B. Short Sample 3/ 
 Annual growth in velocity 
      M1  -1.1  -0.5 0.9 0.0 -1.2 
      M2 2/  -0.5  2.1 -3.3 -1.8 -1.4 
 Standard deviation 
      M1  11.9  11.0 13.4 16.3 11.6 
      M2 2/  13.9  15.4 9.5 14.0 8.2 
  1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite 
      dollarization index exists for most of the period 1980-2001—see Appendix I. 
  2/  Broad money excluding foreign currency deposits.
  3/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III with an index of composite dollarization 
      during the period 1996-2001—see Appendix II.
Table 16. Dollarization and Money Velocity
dollarization 
By type of  By degree of







  High-to- Low-to-
very high moderate Type I  Type II  Type III
Pairwise correlations,  2/ 
  Inflation 
      M1  0.60 0.33 0.53  0.47 0.31
      M2 3/  0.57 0.40 0.62  0.39  0.43
  GDP growth 
      M1 -0.09 0.11 -0.11 -0.03 0.24
      M2 3/  -0.28 0.17 -0.13 -0.19 0.33
  Consumption growth 
      M1 -0.20 0.11 -0.12 -0.07 0.17
      M2 3/  -0.29 0.23 -0.07  0.10 0.17
  1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite dollarization index exists for 
      most of the period 1980-2001—see Appendix I.
  2/ Contemporaneous correlations, average for the group. Number in bold indicates that correlations were statistically
      significant in more than one-half of the group. 
  3/ Broad money excluding foreign currency deposits.




                 Table 17. Money Growth Correlations: Long Sample 1/ 
Very high High Moderate Low Type I  Type II Type III
Pairwise correlations,  2/ 
  Inflation 
      M1  0.94 0.70 0.69 0.26 0.60  0.89  0.53
      M2 3/  0.92 0.81 0.58 0.64 0.71  0.87  0.57
  GDP growth 
      M1  0.10 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.05 0.27
      M2 3/  0.16 -0.11 0.10 0.64 0.07 0.09 0.25
  Consumption growth 
      M1 -0.13 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.13  -0.10  0.14
      M2 3/  -0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.16 -0.01 -0.06 0.13
  1/ All countries classified as Types I, II and III for which the series of the composite dollarization index exists for most
      of the period 1980-2001—see Appendix II.
  2/ Panel correlations, contemporaneous. Statistically significant coefficients in bold. 
  3/ Broad money excluding foreign currency deposits.
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